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PUCL Bulletin,
August 2001
Maheshwar
dam is not sustainable
-- By Medha Patkar
For nearly seven years now, a segment of the Narmada Bachao Andolan has
been fighting the Shree Maheshwar Hydel Project in Madhya Pradesh. Shree
Maheshwar is an independent power project, conceived along the lines of
all the expensive IPPs that followed Enron's Dabhol Power Company. After
Enron's project in Maharashtra and Cogentrix's IPP in Karnataka, the Rs
22.54-billion Shree Maheshwar Hydel Power Company Ltd is arguably the
most controversial power project in the country. In many senses the battle
against Maheshwar has been far more difficult than Enron because it does
not involve the use of an expensive fuel like naphtha/LNG, nor does it
involve a messy fuel like coal.
Also, since hydel
power is traditionally supposed to be cheaper than other fuels, the activists
have faced an uphill task explaining how this project could be more expensive
than Enron. But the truth is that the Maheshwar project (which is to be
built on the Narmada river at Jalaud, and was handed over to the S Kumar
group in 1994), is at least every bit as expensive as all IPPs. Also,
like all other IPPs, it is structured in such a way that almost cent per
cent of the funding comes from public finance. Remember Enron's $ 2.9-billion
project is touted as the largest foreign direct investment in India although
over half the project funds (nearly Rs 60 billion) have either come from
Indian financial institutions or have been guaranteed by them.
Today, the Madhav Godbole committee report on Enron's project establishes
two facts beyond doubt. First, that Indian lenders and financial institutions
who have committed over Rs 60 billion to Enron failed to do proper project
appraisal and did not apply their minds before committing the money. Enron's
power is at least five times more expensive than that produced by the
state electricity boards and clearly unacceptable.
In fact, several industries -- including the railways -- have pleaded
before the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission that they should
not be forced to buy power from Enron. It also proves that it was the
anti-Enron activists who got the tariff projections right and it leads
to the conclusion that they should be given a proper hearing in every
other project where there is strong local agitation. This is important
because, one way or another, it is public funds that are committed to
large private (ad)ventures which pass off as Greenfield projects and Indian
banks, institutions and small investors taking on the risk profile of
venture capitalists. In the Maheshwar valley the NBA activists have been
battling the Shree Maheshwar project for seven years, but their focus
was primarily on the valley where it will displace several farmers and
submerge fertile agricultural land, and -- to an extent -- on the foreign
lenders and collaborators. They also notched up crucial victories. For
instance, a series of US companies which had decided to participate in
the project were convinced to withdraw. In 1997, Bechtel Corporation backed
out; in 1998 it was PacGen which dropped plans to acquire a 49 per cent
stake; in December 2000 Ogden Energy opted out of being a strategic partner.
After PacGen's exit, two German power utilities -- VEW Energie and Bayernwerk
-- agreed to acquire this 49 per cent minority stake but withdrew in 1999.
In fact, the German government also decided not to support the project
after a huge debate in Germany and an independent study by its economic
and social welfare ministry (the report is posted on a German government
Web site dealing with the issue) citing concerns over rehabilitation of
project affected persons. Later, Siemens Ag also backed off from its supplier's
contract, which was to have been backed by the German government guarantee.
In January 2001, the Portuguese government turned down an application
by ABB Ltd (equipment supplier) for the COSEC guarantee for around Rs
2 billion which was to be counter-guaranteed by IFCI. Stunning as it seems,
this stream of withdrawals had no effect whatsoever on the project itself.
Every exit led to a quest for a new collaborator and the project itself
was unhampered by any paucity of funds. Money is routinely made available
to the promoters and at the latest count, they claim to have invested
nearly Rs 5 billion in Maheshwar. The project currently has no strategic
partner but it is unfazed. For the Maheshwar activists, this resilience
of the promoters has been a mystery. It is only after the exposure of
Indian lenders to Enron became public knowledge that they realised what
is the source of the promoters' strength. Lending by Indian banks and
institutions is at the heart of all mega IPP and Greenfield projects and
until they keep handing over funds in driblets, a project never folds
up. A fortnight ago the NBA activists took their protests to the doorsteps
of Indian FIs by holding demonstrations at Reserve Bank of India, ICICI,
IFCI, Industrial Development Bank of India and the two nationalised insurance
majors -- General Insurance Corporation and Life Insurance Corporation.
The demonstrations were followed by the presentation of a memorandum to
all these institutions urging them to take another look at their decision
to fund the project.
As always, the institutions' documentation talks tough. In this case,
it says that no further funds would be disbursed without a strategic investor
being in place, that the promoters will bring back all the capital advances
of Rs 1.064 billion with interest given to various agencies who have not
been awarded any contract, will appoint a concurrent auditor, and bring
in additional funds to meet cost over-run. However, none of these have
been complied with, and the NBA has now decided to target the FIs by issuing
a show-cause notice through Supreme Court advocate Prashant Bhushan.
Among other things, the notice points out that not only have FIs ignored
the fact that various collaborators have walked out of Maheshwar, but
it does not even have environmental and techno-economic clearance for
its latest project cost. Yet, the Indian lenders -- led by IFCI -- have
committed to a financial package of Rs 20 billion which is nearly 90 per
cent of the project cost of Rs 22.54 billion. Without even going into
the issues of rehabilitation, it seems clear that Indian institutions
seem to be bending backwards to accommodate Shree Maheshwar - even when
they have no resources to do so. There is also the issue of power production.
The project has a capacity of 400 MW, but this will depend on the strength
of water available in the Narmada river. The activists have vehemently
contested the company's claims of being able to produce 400 MW of power
except in the monsoons. The project cost, which is high to start with,
will lead to even higher cost power during the non-monsoon period, they
claim. The cost has escalated from Rs 4.65 billion in 1994 to Rs 25.54
billion at latest count in 2001.
The moot question
is, are Indian FIs incapable of proper project appraisal, or are there
other forces at work behind their support to Maheshwar? The exit of so
many foreign lenders alone indicates that there is at least need for an
independent Godbole-type inquiry. Despite the expensive 'education' provided
by Enron, the DPC project is unaffordable. Today, Indian banks and institutions
are lobbying hardest on behalf of the US Company, in order to protect
their money.
Fortunately, Maheshwar
has not reached that stage, nor has as much money been invested. But the
facts presented by the activists make it clear that there is more than
reasonable doubt about the viability of the project, even without going
into critical issues such as rehabilitation of displaced persons and land
available for their resettlement. Clearly, an independent inquiry, by
a committee acceptable to all sides needs to assess the cost and viability
of the project as well as the promoters' claims about how much has already
been spent on it. Until then the project has to be suspended.
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